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The thinking of the world, the unfolded order of things, the 
places of the things in the world, their rising and declining; the course 
of the world, in which every thing finds its place and duration, rise 
and decline, growth and disappearance, light and shade. The splendor 
in which all the things flow, "take place", find their order and the 
darkness of the place where all things have their origin and finally dis-
appear. These are the light and the shade themselves, which in their 
alternating, draw the horizon that Western thought, fading thought, 
since its dawning, has looked upon to find the things of the world and 
the world of the shades which the things end in. 
Two Words 
All finite things take place and have duration, appear and reap-
pear yet, being limited things, are mentionable and utterable. Nomen 
omen: every finite thing destines itself to language. 
There are two words, in the language of Western thought whose 
destiny has been one of giving rise and name to an ordered play of 
light and shade, in the name of the mysterious appearance of the world 
and the speaking of the ordered disappearance of the things. 
Kosmos and Topos conceal long vicissitudes of mutual thought 
while displaying an essence that is closely shared. 
In fact, it is extremely difficult, even fascinating, to com-prehend 
legein, to tie and to loosen the knots, the links between the meanings of 
these two "nouns"**-but they're not simply words-avoiding that 
the several horizons that every noun opens, finally include the sense 
and the values of the other. 
Kosmos has turned to "ordered universe" only when a superior 
universal "intelligence" has been imagined. In pre-philosophical lan-
guage, the meaning of the word was simply "order" . In Homer's 
poems, the arrays of soldiers are described as "en kosmo", simply "in 
order" ... 
On the other hand, Topos, according to Aristotle, is extremely dif-
ficult to grasp, but it manifests a power that is extraordinary and 
"superior" to any other, that same power which, according to Plato, 
makes what is, "in a sense," not to be and what is not, "in a sense," to 
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be. Once more, splendor and darkness: the light of u-topia and the 
obscure world of umeality. 
The Acting of the World and Place of Things 
Kosmos, according to Heraclitus, is the shining, ordered disposi-
tion of all things. It's thunderbolt, fire, sun; it's also the play of a child. 
In the burning play of the universe, the light of the fire is the force 
which settles and individualizes the things in the world; allowing them 
to see the light and, taking them back, fade. The course of the world, 
the play of a child. Universal play doesn't take place in the world, it 
doesn't reveal itself. It isn't a "phenomenon," it can't be placed among 
the things of the world, for it turns into giving, into conferring place 
and time, instead of into what is given. 
The world doesn't last as long as a thing could last in the world; 
the world, at most, may last as long as time itself. 
The course of the world is not. More than defining itself, it pro-
duces itself in the cosmic process of individuation, a process of which 
man is a part. Man's ecstatic opening of himself to the world and his 
thinking of the totality of all things define themselves only in their 
belonging to the course of the world, to the power of individuation 
thanks to which every finite thing takes place and bears a destiny, 
appears and disappears. So, every thing remains in its limits but, at the 
same time, all things are linked in a comprehensive totality; fragments 
take part, participate in the power of the being that is one and univer-
sal, that keeps and puts them together, that abandons and takes care of 
them, that makes them see the light and die. The being of the world 
doesn't find its place near or over the finite things. 
Panatopias 
The state of things shapes an order the moment that things are 
"oriented." When a thing occupies, or expresses, an eccentric place, 
when it's located as "something extra," it gives place to a situation that 
is problematic owing to its "placing in the world." It's something like 
concentrical circles in the water, so fleeting and so ordered ... 
But "placing in the world" expresses, first of all, a very obscure 
and multifaceted situation. The things of the world are always "orien-
tated," insofar as they have a position, and therefore are posted, thus 
defining their own situation and, at the same time, their own horizon. 
This orientation is determined with reference to a zero-point, a full 
stop that is mobile like the things themselves. In this way, the placing 
of everything in the world is expressed by its relation with another de-
termined thing, that is, defined as a thing in the world; and yet the 
world itself, in its "creating an order," is beyond every placing. Every 
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defined thing, from its margins, is contained by and contains another 
thing, which is in the same situation, and "so forth." But what is the 
end [termine] for this going forth? Are things contained in the world 
like the small things are contained in big ones? Must the world be con-
sidered a continent? The answer to the question of how single things 
take part in the universal whole (the eternal play of apeiron and peras) 
may be found in the problematical nature posted by the concept of the 
world. 
The Shining of the World 
Sometimes, however, it happens that a finite thing may shine in 
its inherence in the world and refer to the universal whole so that a 
world fragment may shine in the world light. 
If the world is not an object, a being in the world, and if it cannot 
withdraw from and escape the gazing of phenomena, then no image of 
the world may be drawn, especially on the basis of the thinking of a 
relation between two beings in the world. 
However, it may happen that the finite thing shining in its inher-
ence in the world, instead of referring to an image, becomes transpar-
ent in the world light . 
The finite thing is not necessarily annihilated by this transparen-
cy, though it may be more clearly looked upon as a product and a 
work of the force that individualizes the universal whole, suddenly 
shining with its light . The "transparent" things which may be passed 
through by world light acquire a cosmical depth. The finite thing 
recalls the ruling whole, but not with reference to another thing in the 
world. The thing shining with the world power has become a symbol. 
Therefore, every finite being may become a symbol, "represent-
ing" the universe, when the whole turns up and shines in it; indirectly, 
the world cannot become a symbol because, in finite things, it meets 
with an image that is its own and reflects itself in the symbol. 
The totum is in parte; the whole is representable only through 
symbolical figure and the symbol isn't a copy of the original, but a 
part which represents the whole. When the light of the ruling force of 
the universe falls upon the thing, the thing doesn't assume a new 
aspect: it's still what it was, yet it's no more that thing. 
Hence, the ambiguous dimension of mysteriously com-prehensi-
ble "unreality" and, at the same time, the recurrence of the mysterious 
power of topos. 
Everything said up to now has to do, has necessarily to do with 
artistic experience and with the work of art. 
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The Place Without Margins, or the Margins of a Non-Place 
The new realization of a situation requires something like a para-
doxical gesture, almost a false movement: it's the same peculiar diffi-
culty manifested by a definition, insofar as saying what a situation is 
already expresses the impossibility of representing it, of placing one-
self "in front" of it like every other thing which is placed and oriented. 
It's the situation, instead, which defines itself as a perspective, as a 
viewpoint, limiting one's outlook on occasion. It's an outlook placed 
and oriented for catching, inevitably, the thinking of the horizon: that 
circle which contains and de-limits (horizein) all that is visible from a 
particular point. 
Then the particular and ordered relation between the point and 
the line: the horizon line separates and links sky and earth, and in 
accordance with it, it's possible to orientate, to draw a point, to define 
the position and the place wherein one finds oneself. 
Again, the mysterious power of topos: the invitation to a new 
habit, to "inhabit," to think of the "place" like something more origi-
nary than the space. 
Things are not outside of us, ob-jecta, but the things themselves 
open the originary place that is the origin of the experience in the 
space. The things themselves have always been included in the topos 
outopos of being in the world. 
Again, all of this has inevitably to do with art. 
The "World" of Art 
The encounter with the work of art may be described, in 
Heidegger's opinion, as a meeting with a person who has a world 
"vision" different from ours and with whom we have to compare our-
selves. The work of art so interpreted, not only enters into the world, 
but also sheds a different light-or shadow-upon the order of things. 
In this sense, according to Heidegger, the work of art founds a world, 
showing a system of meanings and producing the ground, that is the 
dark bottom where it takes root. Just on the basis of this movement of 
founding and de-grounding, the effect produced by the work of art on 
the spectator is a crash, a shake, a daze (Stoss, in Heidegger"s words, 
but also shock, like in Benjamin's remarks on the technical repro-
ducibility of a work of art) which makes familiarity with a certain 
presence of things oscillate-in the sense of routine as well-and 
makes the usual order of the everyday world vacillate. (The impact, 
sometimes, is so hard that it causes, beyond the oscillation, reversals, 
whirls and real alterations: the '"upside down" world of the Spanish 
Middle Ages insinuates itself into the "revolt of things" of surrealism, 
while Hoffmann' s automatons peep from within Carra' s orthopaedic 
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man or, seized with technological wonder, from within Marinetti' s 
mechanical man . The "revolving world" -as Eliot guessed-finds its 
sole full stop in artistic creation, because it is considered in its 
whirling). What becomes crucial in Heidegger's and Benjamin's 
remarks is the fact that the bewildering and shaking effect exerted 
over the spectator remains, in the work of art, constitutive and not tem-
porary. 
Suspending world obviousness, the work of art provokes anx-
ious amazement for the "fact" that the world, merely is-a world 
which, giving all the things a sense, is itself empty and negligible. The 
"bewilderment" (Unheimlichkeit) caused by aesthetic experience is, just 
for this reason, the same feeling of anguish: the total gratuitousness of 
the existence of the world; the fact that the world itself has a reference 
to the emptiness, to the chasm: that the world means nothing. 
The oscillation, the dismay which constitutes the work of art are 
then the signs, the presages of an obscure and sudden gaze at the 
chasm, at the emptyness: a distressful "warning" of the nothing of the 
world. 
Again, duty and threat, loss and sense of emptiness. But this time 
emptying out of sense , a sense of the loss of the world and of the lost 
gaze at nothing. 
Exactly like the gaze at the "lack" and at the subject's emptiness, 
which is met and reflected in Velazquez' s Las Meninas or the void, 
which Foucault invites us to look at. Or like the disquieting nihil mirari 
of the mysterious woman sitting as if she were hanging, decentered, 
in Giorgione's Tempest. 
*Italian title L'ordine del giorno plays with a double entendre . A bureaucratic 
expression meaning agenda, it is used in the sense of "the ordered disposition 
of the things in world light" (kosmos ). 
**The Italian word name means both "name" and "noun " . 
